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In the health innovation context, federal regulatory authority is sharply
fragmented among different agencies. The National Institutes of Health,
Food and Drug Administration, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, and other agencies all share responsibilities in the development and
dissemination of new healthcare technologies. Scholars have previously
written about the importance of interagency collaboration both in the
healthcare area and more generally, and about strategies for encouraging
collaborative efforts to promote various policy goals. Under these accounts,
a failure to collaborate between federal agencies may be unfortunate, but it
does not typically result in or exacerbate a crisis. In the COVID-19 context,
however, failures of federal interagency coordination may have had much
more severe negative consequences for the spread of the pandemic in the
United States. This Article first spotlights two examples of healthcare
innovation for COVID-19—diagnostic tests and vaccines—and details both
the ways in which agency failures of collaboration created serious problems
for our COVID-19 response and the ways in which interagency
collaborations have successfully driven innovation and access to these new
technologies. The Article goes on to consider what lessons can be learned
from the successes and failures of these innovative efforts about best—and
worst—practices in interagency collaboration going forward.
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INTRODUCTION
“What we needed was a coordinated response that involved
contributions from multiple agencies… That didn’t happen on testing,
or on a whole lot of other things.”.
– Former FDA Commissioner Dr. Scott Gottlieb1

The COVID-19 pandemic has severely tested the United States’ health
care institutions. The pandemic has exacerbated the racial inequities already
present in our health care system,2 stressed our hollowed-out public health
infrastructure,3 and reduced many people’s trust in their public officials.4 It
has sickened and killed far too many people, both in the United States and
abroad.5
The pandemic has also served as a stress test of our innovation
institutions. Typically, a wide range of public and private sector actors must
1

Michael D. Shear et al., Trump’s Focus as the Pandemic Raged: What Would It Mean
for Him?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/31/us/politics/
trump-coronavirus.html.
2
Samantha Artiga et al., Racial Disparities in COVID-19: Key Findings from Available
Data and Analysis, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Aug. 17, 2020), https://www.kff.org/racialequity-and-health-policy/issue-brief/racial-disparities-covid-19-key-findings-availabledata-analysis/.
3
Lauren Weber et al., Hollowed Out Public Health System Faces More Cuts Amid Virus,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 1, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/b4c4bb2731da9611e6
da5b6f9a52717a; see generally MATT MCKILLOP & VINU ILAKKUVAN, TRUST FOR
AMERICA’S HEALTH, THE IMPACT OF CHRONIC UNDERFUNDING ON AMERICA’S PUBLIC
HEALTH SYSTEM: TRENDS, RISKS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2019) (describing how a lack
of CDC program funding presents obstacles to public health interventions).
4
Liz Hamel et al., KFF Health Tracking Poll—September 2020, KAISER FAM. FOUND.
(Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/report/kff-health-tracking-pollseptember-2020/ (“[T]he share of adults who trust the CDC to provide reliable information
has decreased by 16 percentage points since April.”).
5
Hamdi Alkhshali, Global Coronavirus Death Toll Surpasses 2.5 Million, CNN (Feb.
25, 2021, 1:10 PM), https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/coronavirus-pandemic-vaccineupdates-02-25-21/h_0894eab9f6fb1ab71c8b5a579c478ab6.
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all play a part in bringing a new health technology product to market. Perhaps
the National Institutes of Health (NIH) funds a university laboratory’s basic
research project, which is then licensed to a pharmaceutical company for
further development. That pharmaceutical company must traverse the
complex Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval process before
receiving approval, after which the company would hope to obtain insurance
reimbursement for its product, including from the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS). Physicians and (often) retail pharmacies 6 must be
made aware of the new drug, and ultimately patients may begin to receive it.
This is a long, complex process, often taking more than a decade from start
to finish7 and requiring hundreds of millions or billions of dollars in
investment.8
In a public health crisis of the magnitude of COVID-19, our innovation
institutions could not—and did not—allow innovation to proceed along these
normal time frames and channels. The FDA compressed its usual ten-month
agency review period into just three weeks, 9 companies built enormous
amounts of at-risk vaccine manufacturing capacity (often with federal
support),10 and our innovation ecosystem successfully brought to market two
safe, effective COVID-19 vaccines in less than a year—shattering the
previous record of four years.11 But there were failures as well—failures of
6

Although many drugs are provided through retail pharmacies, others are administered
in physicians’ offices or hospital settings. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N,
MEDICARE PAYMENT STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE PRICE COMPETITION AND VALUE FOR PART
B DRUGS, in REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE AND THE HEALTH CARE DELIVERY
SYSTEM 55 (June 2019) (“Medicare Part B covers drugs and biologics that are administered
by infusion or injection in physician offices and hospital outpatient departments (HOPDs).”).
7
Benjamin N. Roin, The Case for Tailoring Patent Awards Based on Time-to-Market,
61 UCLA L. REV. 672, 719 (2014).
8
See, e.g., Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New
Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 20 (2016) (estimating pre-approval costs
to be $2.558 billion); JORGE MESTRE-FERRANDIZ ET AL., THE R&D COST OF A NEW
MEDICINE 3 (2012), https://www.ohe.org/publications/rd-cost-new-medicine# (estimating
costs at $1.5 billion); Cynthia M. Ho, Drugged Out: How Cognitive Bias Hurts Drug
Innovation, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 419, 426, 448–57 (2014).
9
Noah Weiland & Katie Thomas, Pfizer Applies for Emergency FDA Approval for
COVID-19 Vaccine, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/20/
health/pfizer-covid-vaccine.html; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA Takes Key Action in
Fight Against COVID-19 By Issuing Emergency Use Authorization for First COVID-19
Vaccine (Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-takeskey-action-fight-against-covid-19-issuing-emergency-use-authorization-first-covid-19.
10
See infra text accompanying notes 54–59.
11
Nsikan Akpan, Why a Coronavirus Vaccine Could Take Way Longer than a Year,
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/2020/
04/why-coronavirus-vaccine-could-take-way-longer-than-a-year/ (noting that the mumps
vaccine was developed in approximately four years).
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diagnostic testing which enabled the unseen spread of the pandemic near its
beginning in early 2020, and failures of vaccine administration which delayed
our capacity to end the pandemic.
Many of these failures were traceable to a lack of interagency
collaboration. Federal agencies failed to work together to solve identified
problems until the problems became far larger than they otherwise might
have. Although interagency collaboration is often desirable, its absence may
sometimes be difficult to detect, particularly in the innovation context. It is
hard to “see” the innovative health care technology that could have been
discovered if federal agencies had worked together, or to see how the
regulatory pathways could have been abbreviated in such a circumstance,
precisely because those collaborative efforts did not occur. But the COVID19 pandemic made those failures of interagency collaboration all too visible.
Interagency collaboration has been a recent topic of discussion in the
legal literature, with experts referring to the issue as “one of the central
challenges of modern governance.”12 Scholars have focused on problems
involving legislative delegations of power that are fragmented and
overlapping,13 problems of intra-agency coordination,14 and ways the
executive can “pool” resources delegated to different agencies, 15 among other
topics.16 The COVID-19 pandemic provides the opportunity to examine some
of the hypotheses put forth in the literature, as well as to consider new
questions regarding executive-created interagency collaborations and
collaborations created under emergency conditions.
This Article examines two innovation case studies from the pandemic,
including their successes as well as their failures, to consider what lessons
might be learned from the COVID-19 pandemic for interagency collaboration
going forward. Part I considers the development of diagnostic testing for the
SARS-CoV-2 virus. Failures of interagency collaboration early on in the
pandemic led to catastrophic delays in the development of testing capacity in
the United States, allowing the virus to spread. Months later, though, agencies
12
Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1134 (2012).
13
Id. at 1138; see also Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in
Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 203 (2006); Rachel E. Sachs, Administering
Health Innovation, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1991, 1993 (2018).
14
Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421, 427 (2015).
15
Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 213 (2015).
16
See also, e.g., David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Why Who Does What Matters:
Governmental Design and Agency Performance, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1446, 1451 (2014);
Jason Marisam, Interagency Administration, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183, 183 (2013); Bijal Shah,
Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128 HARV. L. REV. 805, 806–07 (2015);
Jacob S. Sherkow, Administering Patent Litigation, 90 WASH. L. REV. 205, 208 (2015). For
a detailed example outside the legal literature see EUGENE BARDACH, GETTING AGENCIES TO
WORK TOGETHER: THE PRACTICE AND THEORY OF MANAGERIAL CRAFTSMANSHIP (1998).

2021]

ENCOURAGING INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION:

75

began working together to develop innovative new diagnostic technologies—
a collaboration that is now bearing fruit.
Part II examines Operation Warp Speed (OWS), which drove the
development of vaccines to prevent COVID-19. OWS was successful in its
goal of supporting the development of safe, effective vaccines faster than had
ever been done before—but it failed in its earliest promises to administer
them to patients. Although there are many contributing factors to this failure,
at least some of the problems are due to failures of interagency collaboration.
Part III considers three lessons that can be learned from these two
examples, and how those lessons might not only inform future policymakers
(and future pandemics) but also how they might bear on existing scholarly
debates. The role of agenda-setting power, the importance of organizational
structure, and the creation of cultures of collaboration are all important
factors in the success and failure of innovation efforts both during the
COVID-19 pandemic and beyond. To be sure, we should be careful not to
overlearn lessons drawn from a singular, crisis event—or a singular
individual. It will be important to look to other examples of interagency
collaboration, especially those that took place under less critical
circumstances, to support or refute these arguments, as Part III does. At the
same time, it might be the case that the scale of the COVID-19 pandemic
provides opportunities to learn about whole-of-government efforts that are
not present in much smaller-scale examples of interagency collaboration.

I. DIAGNOSTIC DELAYS AND INNOVATION
A robust diagnostic testing system for COVID-19 is essential to identify
where the SARS-CoV-2 virus is spreading and to enable public health
officials to determine and implement appropriate mitigation efforts.
However, particularly early in the pandemic, federal agencies—especially the
Centers for Disease Control (CDC), FDA, and CMS—did not collaborate in
the development or distribution of diagnostic testing for the SARS-CoV-2
virus. Their failure to do so has been analyzed very publicly, with a range of
media and scholarly reports explaining how a lack of interagency
coordination resulted in avoidable delays in the development and
dissemination of accurate diagnostic tests for COVID-19.
This Part will first describe the ways in which the actions of individual
federal agencies slowed the development of COVID-19 diagnostics, before
explaining how stronger interagency coordination could have sped the rollout
of accurate diagnostics. This Part closes by considering a more positive
example of interagency collaboration in the diagnostics space, in which a
collaborative interagency group is aiming to drive the development and
distribution of testing technology going forward.
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In January 2020, as public health agencies began to learn more about the
SARS-CoV-2 virus and its potential spread into the United States, the CDC
developed its own diagnostic test for the virus and began to share testing kits
with state public health laboratories. Unfortunately, soon after distribution a
problem with the kits was discovered, 17 causing the CDC to tell states to stop
using the test kits.18 For many weeks, as the virus spread largely undetected
in the United States, the CDC was unable to solve the problem with its test. 19
Meanwhile, other countries were able to implement their own testing
programs by using the protocol that had been developed and publicly shared
by the World Health Organization (WHO) (a protocol the CDC declined to
adopt).20 Finally, on February 28, the agency announced that states could
begin retesting using a modified version of the CDC kits.21
The FDA itself took actions which also likely delayed the development
of testing capacity in the United States. Health and Human Services (HHS)
Secretary Alex Azar had made an emergency declaration which unlocked the
FDA’s ability to grant emergency use authorizations (EUAs), 22 enabling test
manufacturers to enter the market with less premarket review than would
typically be required for companies producing and shipping testing kits.23 Yet
particularly given the novel pathogen involved, products were still slow to
meet even these more limited evidentiary requirements,24 and companies
reported spending weeks working with the agency before obtaining EUAs for
their products.25 Laboratories aiming to develop their own in-house
diagnostics (as compared with companies that planned to ship diagnostic kits
around the country) have largely been exempt from FDA review, and for
these products even the limited EUA requirements represented more onerous
regulation than they have come to anticipate, contributing to delays in

17

Michael D. Shear et al., The Lost Month: How a Failure to Test Blinded the U.S. to
COVID-19, N.Y. TIMES (March 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/us/testingcoronavirus-pandemic.html.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
David Willman, The CDC’s Failed Race Against COVID-19: A Threat
Underestimated and a Test Overcomplicated, WASH. POST (Dec. 26, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/cdc-covid/2020/12/25/c2b418ae-420611eb-8db8-395dedaaa036_story.html.
21
Id.; CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Transcript for the CDC Telebriefing Update on
COVID-19 (Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/t0228-COVID-19update.html.
22
Declaration by Alex M. Azar II, U.S. Dep’t Health & Hum. Servs., Determination of
a Public Health Emergency (Feb. 4, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/135010/download.
23
21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(c)(2) (2012).
24
See Shear, supra note 17.
25
Id.
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authorization.26 Although the FDA’s actions were motivated by the need to
maintain its evidentiary standards, despite—or even especially because of—
the pandemic,27 its EUA requirements slowed the ability of other laboratories
to fill the void left by the CDC’s absence.
To be clear, there was sufficient communication between the CDC and
the FDA to enable the FDA to grant the CDC’s test an emergency
authorization in early February (even after the agency’s testing problems
became evident).28 But in other situations, the agencies appeared to be at odds
with each other. At one point, the CDC even blocked an FDA official (though
temporarily) from entering the CDC to help address the ongoing testing
problems.29
Independent laboratory certification requirements overseen by CMS
under its authority provided by the Clinical Laboratory Improvement
Amendments of 1988 (CLIA)30 likely also limited the set of labs eligible to
perform COVID-19 diagnostic testing. Many academic laboratories, in
particular, had the technical ability to perform COVID-19 tests, but they did
not possess CLIA certification.31 Some were able to partner with CLIAcertified labs to offer COVID-19 testing, but many were not able to overcome
the administrative barriers to doing so.32
Interagency coordination between CDC, FDA, and CMS could have
avoided or at least mitigated these delays, particularly those attributable to
the problems with the CDC’s own test. Even if these agencies did not work
together on their own initiative, the three agencies all share a parent agency
in HHS. But rather than working to identify conflicts between the agencies
and help accelerate the diagnostic development and dissemination process, 33
26

Barbara J. Evans & Ellen Wright Clayton, Deadly Delay: The FDA’s Role in
America’s COVID-Testing Debacle, 130 YALE L. J. F. 78, 88 (2020).
27
Nicholson Price et al., How Is Regulatory Policy Influencing the Development and
Marketing of Antibody Testing for COVID-19?, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION (May 4, 2020, 3:56
PM), https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2020/05/how-is-regulatory-policyinfluencing.html; see also DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER:
ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 10–11 (2010)
(presenting the agency’s regulatory power as deriving in part from its reputation for
consumer protection).
28
Willman, supra note 20.
29
Dan Diamond, CDC Blocked FDA Official from Premises, POLITICO (Mar. 3, 2020),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/03/cdc-blocked-fda-official-premises-119684.
30
Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-578, § 353,
102 Stat. 2903, 2903-04 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 263a (2018)); CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA)
(2020), https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/CLIA.
31
Amy Maxmen, Thousands of Coronavirus Tests Are Going Unused in US Labs,
NATURE (April 9, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-01068-3.
32
Id.
33
Dan Diamond & Adam Cancryn, Azar in the Crosshairs for Delays in Virus Tests,
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HHS Secretary Azar reportedly “blocked efforts” to allow private
laboratories to obtain testing approval in the CDC’s absence 34 and waited to
take action to address testing issues until the very end of February, only after
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease Director Dr. Tony Fauci
encouraged Azar’s chief of staff to act.35 Administration officials have
referred to Secretary Azar’s conduct as “a management failure,” noting that
“CDC and FDA should have been working hand in hand.” 36
The public might also have expected White House officials to take
stronger roles here as well and aim to solve these types of problems. One
problem, as discussed below in Part III.A, may have been that there were
signals coming from President Trump to deprioritize testing, partly in an
effort to downplay the number of cases.37 As a result, the COVID-19 Task
Force (itself an interagency coalition) may have felt pressure to focus on other
areas of the government’s response. At the same time, it is possible that the
relevant government officials did not understand which agencies needed to
be represented in the decision-making process. For instance, FDA
Commissioner Stephen Hahn and CMS Administrator Seema Verma did not
even become part of the COVID-19 Task Force until March, after the
government’s initial testing issues had been resolved. 38
These initial testing failures were certainly catastrophic for the
government’s ability to detect and respond to the COVID-19 pandemic in the
early months of 2020. But since then, there have also been more positive
examples of interagency coordination in the COVID-19 diagnostics area.
Most notably, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) is leading the Rapid
Acceleration of Diagnostics (RADx) Initiative, aiming to “speed innovation
in the development, commercialization, and implementation of technologies
for COVID-19 testing.”39 Through RADx, the NIH has sought to work
together with the CDC, FDA, Biomedical Advanced Research and
Development Agency (BARDA), and Defense Advanced Research Projects
POLITICO (March 2, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/02/azar-crosshairsdelays-coronavirus-tests-118796.
34
Rebecca Ballhaus & Stephanie Armour, Health Chief’s Early Missteps Set Back
Coronavirus Response, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/healthchiefs-early-missteps-set-back-coronavirus-response-11587570514.
35
See Shear, supra note 17; Willman, supra note 20.
36
Diamond & Cancryn, supra note 33.
37
See infra Part III.A.
38
Press Release, The White House, Vice President Pence and Secretary Azar Add Key
Administration Officials to the Coronavirus Task Force (Mar. 2, 2020),
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/vice-president-pence-secretaryazar-add-key-administration-officials-coronavirus-task-force-3.
39
NAT’L INST. HEALTH, Rapid Acceleration of Diagnostics (RADx),
https://www.nih.gov/research-training/medical-research-initiatives/radx (last visited May 8,
2021).
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Agency (DARPA) to encourage each of these goals. 40
The $1.5 billion RADx Initiative aimed to use a “shark tank”-type 41
approach to bring to market at-home and point-of-care tests for COVID-19,
with the initial goal of making “millions of accurate and easy-to-use tests per
week available to all Americans by the end of summer 2020, and even more
in time for the flu season.”42 Although the Initiative may not have quite met
this initial goal,43 it has certainly sped the development of a range of new
diagnostic options for COVID-19. 44 One grantee, Ginkgo Bioworks, 45 is
innovating in pooled testing in an effort to provide surveillance capabilities
for K-12 schools around the country.46 Another grantee, Ellume,47 received
the very first FDA authorization for a rapid at-home test that is available overthe-counter.48
40

Id.
NAT’L INST. HEALTH, RADx Programs, https://www.nih.gov/research-training/
medical-research-initiatives/radx/radx-programs (last updated Dec. 23, 2020); ABC, About
Shark Tank, https://abc.com/shows/shark-tank/about-the-show (last visited May 8, 2021).
42
NAT’L INST. HEALTH, NIH Mobilizes National Innovation Initiative for COVID-19
Diagnostics (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/nihmobilizes-national-innovation-initiative-covid-19-diagnostics.
43
As the NIH noted, “RADx Tech and RADx-ATP contracts are expected to increase
test capacity by 2.7 million tests per day by the end of 2020.” NAT’L INST. HEALTH, NIH
RADx Initiative Advances Six New COVID-19 Testing Technologies (Oct. 6, 2020),
https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/nih-radx-initiative-advances-six-newcovid-19-testing-technologies. However, many fewer tests were being conducted by the end
of 2020, with testing delays being widely reported. Ken Alltucker, The Demand for COVID19 Testing is Up, Stressing Labs and Delaying Results, USA TODAY (Nov. 26, 2020),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/2020/11/26/covid-19-testing-delays-recorddemand-thanksgiving/6417506002/.
44
RADx has also created additional grant programs with related goals. For instance, the
“RADx Radical” program supports “non-traditional viral screening approaches” to combat
the pandemic. NAT’L INST. HEALTH, NIH to Support Radical Approaches to Nationwide
COVID-19 Testing and Surveillance (Dec. 21, 2020), https://www.nih.gov/newsevents/news-releases/nih-support-radical-approaches-nationwide-covid-19-testingsurveillance. For instance, RADx Radical grantees include those developing airborne
detectors for continuous surveillance of large spaces as well as development of wastewater
technologies for estimating community infection levels. Id.
45
NAT’L INST. HEALTH, NIH Delivering New COVID-19 Testing Technologies to Meet
U.S. Demand (July 31, 2020), https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/nihdelivering-new-covid-19-testing-technologies-meet-us-demand.
46
Ginkgo Bioworks, Ginkgo Bioworks Launches COVID-19 Pooled Classroom Testing
Pilot
for
K-12
Schools,
CISION PR NEWSWIRE
(Dec.
23,
2020),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/ginkgo-bioworks-launches-covid-19-pooledclassroom-testing-pilot-for-k-12-schools-301198122.html.
47
NAT’L INST. HEALTH, supra note 43.
48
NAT’L INST. HEALTH, NIH-Funded COVID-19 Home Test is First to Receive Overthe-Counter Authorization from FDA (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.nih.gov/newsevents/news-releases/nih-funded-covid-19-home-test-first-receive-over-counter41
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The steps involved in developing and disseminating this wide range of
tests illustrates the importance of the interagency collaboration involved in
RADx. These companies must not only address any scientific challenges in
the development of these tests, but they must also obtain FDA authorization
for their new technologies and provide broad access to them. Particularly for
smaller start-ups with little or no prior experience dealing with regulatory
agencies, these challenges may prove overwhelming. The involvement in
RADx of FDA, CDC, and other agencies is designed to help surmount these
difficulties. The FDA is working with RADx not only “to provide general
advice on test validation” but is also “prioritizing the review of emergency
use authorization (EUA) for tests supported by RADx.” 49 More purposeful
use of interagency collaborations like these early in the pandemic may have
been able to avoid or at least minimize some of the initial testing failures
involved.

II. PRIORITIZING VACCINE DEVELOPMENT, RATHER THAN
DISTRIBUTION
The development and broad distribution of vaccines that are effective at
preventing COVID-19 is critical to enabling the world to move beyond the
COVID-19 pandemic. Unlike with diagnostic testing, the Trump
Administration quickly established a whole-of-government initiative—
Operation Warp Speed (OWS)—with the initial goal of “deliver[ing] 300
million doses of a safe, effective vaccine for COVID-19 by January 2021.” 50
Led by the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Secretary of
Defense,51 OWS aimed to bring together officials from dozens of different
authorization-fda. More recently, the federal government has signed a procurement deal with
Ellume, awarding $231.8 million to the company in exchange for 8.5 million tests. Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, DoD Awards $231.8 Million Contract to Ellume USA LLC
to Increase Domestic Production Capacity and Deliver COVID-19 Home Tests (Feb. 1,
2021), https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2488793/dod-awards2318-million-contract-to-ellume-usa-llc-to-increase-domestic-product/.
49
NAT’L INST. HEALTH, supra note 45.
50
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Fact Sheet: Explaining Operation Warp
Speed, https://www.hhs.gov/coronavirus/explaining-operation-warp-speed/index.html
(last updated Jan. 15, 2021). Although quickly at least some of the public messaging shifted,
to promise only “the initial doses” being made available by January 2021, while other public
messaging still promised far greater achievements. Id. As one example, White House Chief
of Staff Mark Meadows publicly stated in September that the goal was to have 100 million
doses available by the end of October and 300 million doses by January 2021. Morgan
Chalfant, Meadows Disputes CDC Director’s Vaccine Timeline, THE HILL (Sept. 17, 2020),
https://thehill.com/homenews
/administration/516855-meadows-disputes-cdc-directors-vaccine-timeline.
51
Nicholas Florko, New Document Reveals Scope and Structure of Operation Warp
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government agencies to collaborate to accelerate the development of
effective vaccines. OWS was able to meet part of its goal, as the FDA granted
emergency use authorizations for COVID-19 vaccines from both PfizerBioNTech and Moderna in December 2020. 52 But OWS largely failed in its
goal of distributing those vaccines, with 14 million vaccines distributed and
just over 3 million actually administered by the end of 2020. 53 Many of these
early distributional failures appear attributable to failures of interagency
coordination.
This Part will first describe the successes of OWS, explaining how intense
focus on interagency collaboration and public-private collaboration truly did
accelerate the development and regulatory review of these new vaccines. This
Part will go on to consider OWS’ relative failures on distribution and
administration of COVID-19 vaccines, explaining how a lack of interagency
coordination caused early delays in the vaccine rollout, and how those
failures could have been avoided.
OWS provided essential support in the development of the PfizerBioNTech and Moderna vaccines, leading to their record-breaking
authorization by the FDA less than one year after the companies began to
develop the vaccines.54 The support provided by OWS to these and other
vaccine manufacturers was both financial and logistical. 55 It would not have
been possible to provide these types of support without the significant
interagency collaboration facilitated by OWS.
OWS provided financial support to a range of potential vaccine
candidates in two primary ways: encouraging at-risk manufacturing and
Speed and Underscores Vast Military Involvement, STAT (Sept. 28, 2020),
https://www.statnews.com/2020/09/28/operation-warp-speed-vast-military-involvement/.
At the time of Operation Warp Speed’s creation, Mark Esper served as the Secretary of
Defense, though after President Trump fired Esper days after the November 2020 elections,
Acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller took over this role. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., supra note 50.
52
Carl Zimmer et al., Coronavirus Vaccine Tracker, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/science/coronavirus-vaccine-tracker.html (last
visited Jan. 26, 2021).
53
Orion Rummler, U.S. Set to End 2020 With Just over 3 Million Vaccine Doses
Administered, AXIOS (Dec. 31, 2020), https://www.axios.com/coronavirus-vaccinesadministered-2020-9ec0cebf-58cd-4294-8b1e-9334c76363c8.html.
54
See, e.g., Zimmer et al., supra note 52 (examining the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines’
expedited authorization timelines).
55
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FROM THE FACTORY TO THE FRONTLINES: THE
OPERATION WARP SPEED STRATEGY FOR DISTRIBUTING A COVID-19 VACCINE (2020),
https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/16/2002498509/-1/1/1/OPERATION_WARP_SPEED
_STRATEGY_FOR_DISTRIBUTING_COVID19_VACCINE.PDF (outlining a strategy
for vaccine distribution, administration, monitoring, and engagement dependent on
communication and cooperation at the state, tribal, and local government levels).
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securing advanced purchases of the resulting vaccines. 56 Given the high cost
of building the manufacturing capacity for a new vaccine, pharmaceutical
companies are relatively unlikely to invest in developing such capacity while
there is still a high risk that their product may fail in clinical trials, causing
them to lose their investments in manufacturing. 57 But given the enormous
social costs of the COVID-19 pandemic, one critical goal of OWS was to
invest in at-risk manufacturing capacity for several chosen candidates. OWS
invested hundreds of millions of dollars in the manufacturing efforts of each
of a range of vaccine candidate sponsors,58 expecting that some of these
investments would not pan out—but knowing that the social value of the ones
that did would far exceed the financial investment.
Moderna was one such company benefiting from these investments, as
early as April 2020 accepting up to $483 million in funding to support the
scale-up of their manufacturing efforts and the completion of their late-stage
clinical trials.59 As Moderna had never brought a product to market
successfully before, they gladly partnered with the federal government to
develop at-risk manufacturing capacity for their vaccine candidate. By
contrast, Pfizer, already one of the world’s largest pharmaceutical firms and
vaccine manufacturers, did not accept this funding, although its German
Partner, BioNTech, did accept €375 million from the German government for
similar manufacturing and clinical trials purposes. 60 Pfizer began
preparations to shift its manufacturing capacity toward a COVID-19 vaccine
as early as March 2020,61 with CEO Albert Bourla noting that “[i]f we were
56
Bhaven N. Sampat & Kenneth C. Shadlen, The COVID-19 Innovation System, 40
HEALTH AFFS. 400, 402 (2021).
57
Sarah McCammon, NIH Director Hopes For At Least 1 Safe and Effective Vaccine by
Year’s End, HOUSTON PUBLIC MEDIA (June 7, 2020, 12:37 PM),
https://www.houstonpublicmedia.org/npr/2020/06/07/868833292/nih-director-hopes-for-atleast-1-safe-and-effective-vaccine-by-years-end/.
58
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 51 (identifying candidate vaccines
and the manufacturing funding provided by OWS, including $1 billion for Johnson &
Johnson and $1.6 billion for Novavax).
59
Id.; see also MODERNA, Moderna Announces Award from U.S. Government Agency
BARDA for up to $483 Million to Accelerate Development of mRNA Vaccine (mRNA-1273)
Against Novel Coronavirus (Apr. 16, 2020, 5:55 PM), https://investors.modernatx.com/
news-releases/news-release-details/moderna-announces-award-us-government-agencybarda-483-million (noting the award “will fund manufacturing process scale-up to enable
large-scale production in 2020 for pandemic response”).
60
GLOBENEWSWIRE, BioNTech to Receive Up To €375M in Funding from German
Federal Ministry of Education and Research to Support COVID-19 Vaccine Program
BNT162 (Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2020/09/15/
2093535/0/en/BioNTech-to-Receive-up-to-375M-in-Funding-from-German-FederalMinistry-of-Education-and-Research-to-Support-COVID-19-Vaccine-ProgramBNT162.html.
61
Jared S. Hopkins, How Pfizer Delivered a COVID Vaccine in Record Time: Crazy

2021]

ENCOURAGING INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION:

83

unsuccessful, we would have to write off $2 billion.”62 For Pfizer, with $52
billion in annual revenues, Dr. Bourla emphasized, “This is painful for any
corporation, but it was not going to break us.” 63
But OWS also provided billions in financial support—including to both
Pfizer and Moderna—in the form of advance purchase commitments of
vaccines.64 The United States (and other countries around the world)
contracted to purchase enormous quantities of vaccines well before those
vaccines received marketing authorization. OWS reserved more vaccine
doses (from manufacturers whose vaccine candidates made use of a diverse
range of technological approaches) than necessary to vaccinate the entire
American population,65 again expecting that some vaccine candidates would
be unsuccessful. The United States initially ordered 100 million doses of
Pfizer-BioNTech’s vaccine for $1.95 billion in July 2020, 66 and in August
similarly ordered 100 million doses of Moderna’s vaccine for $1.5 billion.67
In other situations, advanced purchase commitments like these have served
as effective innovation drivers, where the vaccine manufacturer cannot be
sure that there is a viable market for the product in question.68 Here, though,
Deadlines, a Pushy CEO, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11, 2020, 9:34 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/how-pfizer-delivered-a-covid-vaccine-in-record-time-crazy-deadlines-a-pushy-ceo11607740483; Nathan Vardi, The Race Is On: Why Pfizer may be the Best Bet to Deliver a
Vaccine by This Fall, FORBES (May 20, 2020, 6:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
nathanvardi/2020/05/20/the-man-betting-1-billion-that-pfizer-can-deliver-a-vaccine-bythis-fall/?sh=464b6508382e.
62
Sharon LaFraniere et al., Politics, Science, and the Remarkable Race for a
Coronavirus Vaccine, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/
21/us/politics/coronavirus-vaccine.html.
63
Id. As Moderna CEO Stephan Bancel noted, “[W]e don’t have a balance sheet like
Pfizer.” Id.
64
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 50.
65
Id. (identifying the pre-ordered doses, including 300 million from AstraZeneca alone,
100 million from Johnson & Johnson, 100 million from Novavax, 100 million from
GlaxoSmithKline, in addition to the vaccines from Pfizer and Moderna).
66
PFIZER, Pfizer and BioNTech Announce an Agreement with U.S. Government for Up
to 600 Million Doses of mRNA-based Vaccine Candidate Against SARS-CoV-2 (July 22,
2020, 7:10 AM), https://www.pfizer.com/news/press-release/press-release-detail/pfizerand-biontech-announce-agreement-us-government-600.
67
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Trump Administration Collaborates with
Moderna to Produce 100 Million Doses of COVID-19 Investigational Vaccine (Aug. 11,
2020),
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/08/11/trump-administration-collaborateswith-moderna-produce-100-million-doses-covid-19-investigational-vaccine.html. As of this
writing, the United States is planning to purchase enough vaccine from Pfizer and Moderna
alone to vaccinate up to 300 million Americans. Adam Cancryn & Rachel Roubein, Biden
Administration to Buy 200 Million More Doses of COVID Vaccine, POLITICO (Jan. 26, 2021,
4:30 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/26/biden-covid-vaccine-purchase462803.
68
These commitments are a type of “pull” mechanism, in which sponsors “commit to
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it is unlikely that these advanced purchases made the difference in convincing
manufacturers to invest in the development of vaccines for this truly global
pandemic.69 It is more likely that they encouraged companies to increase the
speed of their development process, where possible, and that they enabled
(mostly wealthy) countries to reserve doses for their citizens, in a way that
creates distributional concerns globally. 70
purchase a specified number of doses at a specified price if a vaccine meeting certain
specifications were developed.” Michael Kremer, Pharmaceuticals and the Developing
World, 16 J. ECON. PERSPS. 67, 83 (2002). This “pull” mechanism thus provides certain
rewards for companies who succeed in developing such a product, while also ensuring access
for countries at defined prices. Previously, GAVI’s Advance Market Commitment (AMC)
was the premier example of this innovation policy tool, where GAVI and other international
stakeholders used the AMC to encourage the development of a vaccine for pneumococcal
disease that would be particularly administered in low-income countries. GAVI’s AMC has
resulted in the administration of pneumococcal vaccines to hundreds of millions of children
worldwide. AMC SECRETARIAT OF GAVI, ADVANCE MARKET COMMITMENT FOR
PNEUMOCOCCAL VACCINES ANNUAL REPORT: 1 JANUARY – 31 DECEMBER 2019, at 6 (2020),
https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/document/2020/2019-Pneumococcal-AMCAnnual-Report.pdf.
69
See Nicholson Price et al., Are COVID-19 Vaccine Advance Purchases a Form of
Vaccine Nationalism, An Effective Spur to Innovation, or Something in Between?, WRITTEN
DESCRIPTION (Aug. 5, 2020), https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2020/08/are-covid19-vaccine-advance-purchases.html (“COVID-19 is truly global in scale; there is
an enormous potential market for the vaccine. There is also less concern that the disease will
dissipate before a vaccine arrives, as COVID-19 is harder to contain than other diseases for
which vaccines have been researched.”).
70
There is concern that countries have engaged in “vaccine nationalism,” a situation in
which “countries push to get first access to a supply of vaccines and potentially hoard key
inputs for vaccine production . . . .” MARCO HAFNER ET AL., COVID-19 AND THE COST OF
VACCINE NATIONALISM, RAND at iii
(2020), https://www.rand.org/pubs/
research_reports/RRA769-1.html; see also Ana Santos Rutschman, The Reemergence of
Vaccine Nationalism, GEO. J. OF INT’L AFFAIRS (forthcoming), https://gjia.georgetown.edu/
2020/07/03/the-reemergence-of-vaccine-nationalism/ (“Law, policy, and geopolitics have
systematically given selected countries the ability to negotiate agreements that further their
interests to the detriment of public health in less developed economies.”). One response to
these concerns is the development of COVAX, aiming to promote global and equitable
access to a COVID-19 vaccine. WORLD HEALTH ORG., COVAX: Working for Global
Equitable Access to COVID-19 Vaccines (2021), https://www.who.int/initiatives/actaccelerator/covax. COVAX recognizes that because of the global nature of the pandemic,
“no one is safe, unless everyone is safe.” Id. Through COVAX, high- and middle-income
countries can help subsidize access to COVID-19 vaccines for low-income countries,
ensuring that residents of all nations have access to the resulting vaccines. Under the Trump
Administration, the United States was one of just two countries globally (the other being
Russia) to decline to join COVAX, due to the involvement of the WHO (and the Trump
Administration’s concerns about the WHO), but the Biden administration has announced that
the U.S. will be joining COVAX after all. Dave Lawler, Biden Will Bring U.S. Into COVAX
Vaccine Initiative, Blinken Says, AXIOS (Jan. 19, 2021), https://www.axios.com/us-covaxinitiative-biden-tony-blinken-68181bd3-41bd-4dca-8317-e1e30b120fd5.html.
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Warp Speed-funded manufacturers also received logistical and
operational support. Moderna relayed two notable issues that arose during
their clinical trials process:
When Moderna discovered this summer that an air handling
unit for its factory could not be delivered over a weekend
because of Covid-19 limitations on interstate trucking, the
major’s team stepped in. Warp Speed officials arranged a law
enforcement escort to accompany the massive piece of
equipment from the Midwest to its Massachusetts
manufacturing plant.
The team again sprang into action when Moderna discovered
that a specialized pump, needed to make the first batches of
vaccine for the clinical trials, was marooned in a rail car and
was not going to be delivered on time. Federal workers
tracked down the train and rummaged through it until they
found the pump.71
“Instrumental” interventions like these72 ensured that Moderna was able
to complete its clinical trials as quickly as possible.
The different areas of expertise involved in these areas explains why a
foundation of strong interagency collaboration was critical in supporting
OWS. Expert scientific agencies, including NIH and BARDA, were critical
in the process of selecting a range of vaccine candidates for investment.73
Once identified, each vaccine maker was assigned a team of “around 15 trial
specialists, epidemiologists, and budget experts” aiming to assist the firm as
it navigated the clinical trials process.74 Logistical experts based in military
agencies helped remove operational challenges as they arose, as Moderna’s
examples detail.75 Similarly, the military has comparative expertise in the use
of procurement contracts to encourage the development and supply of new
technologies, something that HHS has not previously focused on (despite its
use globally).76 Any single agency or even the combination of the healthfocused agencies could not have completed all of these tasks. The unison of
scientific expertise and logistical support was essential to the record-breaking
71

LaFraniere et al., supra note 62.
Id.
73
Jon Cohen, Operation Warp Speed’s Opaque Choices of COVID-19 Vaccines Draw
Senate Scrutiny, SCI. MAG. (July 2, 2020, 7:10 PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/
2020/07/operation-warp-speed-s-opaque-choices-covid-19-vaccines-draw-senate-scrutiny.
74
LaFraniere et al., supra note 62.
75
Florko, supra note 51.
76
Sarah E. Light, The Military-Environmental Complex, 55 B.C. L. REV. 879, 881-82
(2014).
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development of both the Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna vaccines.
To be sure, OWS did not include representatives from every relevant
agency. Perhaps most notably, the FDA was largely absent from the
process.77 In part, this was by design, due to the need to maintain FDA
impartiality and independence over later decisions that would be made to
permit these products to come to market or not.78 Dr. Peter Marks, the
Director of the FDA’s Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, was
initially named to be part of OWS but soon withdrew to focus on the agency
full-time.79
Even as OWS succeeded in its goal of bringing effective vaccines against
COVID-19 to market rapidly, it did not have such success in meeting its
stated goals around supply and distribution. Throughout the fall, OWS and
other Trump Administration officials repeatedly stated that they planned to
vaccinate twenty million people in December,80 though ultimately just over
three million Americans received the vaccine before the end of the year. 81
Although there are undoubtedly many contributors to the slow vaccine
rollout,82 at least some of these delays were due to failures of interagency
77

Dr. Janet Woodcock took a leave from her role as head of the FDA’s Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research to lead OWS’ therapeutics initiative, which was separate from its
vaccine arm. Florko, supra note 51.
78
Id.
79
At least some news accounts suggested that political issues may have been at play in
his withdrawal. Sarah Owermohle, FDA Struggles to Remain Independent Amid Race for
Virus Cure, POLITICO (June 3, 2020, 7:55 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/
06/03/fda-struggles-to-remain-independent-amid-race-for-virus-cure-299127.
80
Olivia Goldhill, On the Ground, the Pledge to Vaccinate 20 Million Against Covid19 in December Seems Unrealistic, STAT (Dec. 7, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/
12/07/pledge-to-vaccinate-20-million-against-covid19-in-december-seems-unrealistic/.
81
Rummler, supra note 53.
82
One large contributing factor, for instance, was a failure of communication between
the federal government and the states (who were ultimately responsible for vaccinating their
residents), and an associated lack of support. The federal government primarily hoped to
“shift responsibility for leading the fight against the pandemic . . . to the states.” Michael D.
Shear et al., Inside Trump’s Failure: The Rush to Abandon Leadership Role on the Virus,
N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/18/us/politics/trumpcoronavirus-response-failure-leadership.html. But the federal government did not provide
states with the financial support they needed to do so. Trump officials even “actively lobbied
Congress to deny state governments any extra funding for the COVID-19 vaccine rollout,”
even as states warned that they needed the additional resources. Nicholas Florko, Trump
Officials Actively Lobbied to Deny States Money for Vaccine Rollout Last Fall, STAT (Jan.
31, 2021), https://www.statnews.com/2021/01/31/trump-officials-lobbied-to-deny-statesmoney-for-vaccine-rollout/. (“It’s true that the states hadn’t spent most of the money by
October. State health departments, for their part, say there are several good reasons why. For
one, they hadn’t begun vaccinating anyone yet.”). States often received conflicting
information from the federal government about how many vaccine doses they would be
receiving, making their jobs more difficult. See, e.g., Ellie Kaufman et al., States Told by
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coordination, as the example of long-term care facilities illustrates.
Perhaps the most vulnerable population during the pandemic has been
residents of long-term care and other assisted living facilities. These residents
are typically elderly and may have other chronic conditions, and they are
typically unable to socially distance as they live in congregate care settings.
As a result, nursing home residents have been hit hard by the pandemic:
although just 5% of all diagnosed cases are linked to nursing homes, 34% of
all deaths are, with more than 172,000 nursing home residents dying of
COVID-19 as of the end of February.83 While the case fatality rate from
COVID-19 nationwide is close to 2%, that rate climbs to 10% for patients
who are residents of nursing homes.84
Because of these vulnerabilities, the CDC’s Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (ACIP) recommended that residents of long-term
care facilities should be among the first people to be offered access to any
authorized vaccines against COVID-19 (as well as health care personnel). 85
On December 13, after Pfizer’s vaccine had received its EUA, HHS Secretary
Azar predicted that all nursing home residents could be vaccinated by
Christmas.86 But as of the end of January, tens of thousands of residents still
had not received their first dose of the vaccines, with the process estimated
to run into mid-February.87 In many states, the process did not even begin
Federal Government They Will Receive Fewer Pfizer Vaccine Doses Next Week, Sparking
Confusion, CNN (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/17/politics/pfizer-vaccinefewer-doses-states-confusion/index.html. (“Officials in numerous states including Iowa,
Illinois, Washington, Michigan, and Oregon have said they were recently told they would
receive fewer doses than originally planned for by the federal government’s Operation Warp
Speed.”).
83
More Than One-Third of U.S. Coronavirus Deaths Are Linked to Nursing Homes,
N.Y. TIMES (Updated Feb. 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/
coronavirus-nursing-homes.html. In some states, these rates are far higher—in nine states,
more than half of recorded deaths are linked to long-term care facilities. Id.
84
Id.
85
Kathleen Dooling et al., The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices’
Updated Interim Recommendation for Allocation of COVID-19 Vaccine—United States,
December 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP’T 1657, 1657 (2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm695152e2.htm?s_cid=mm695152e2_w. All
states have followed these recommendations, though several have added other populations
to this priority group (such as first responders or other vulnerable individuals, such as
psychiatric patients). Jennifer Kates et al., The COVID-19 “Vaccination Line”: An Update
on State Prioritization Plans, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Jan. 11, 2021),
https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/the-covid-19-vaccination-line-anupdate-on-state-prioritization-plans/.
86
Melissa Quinn, Azar Says All Nursing Home Residents Could be Vaccinated by
Christmas, CBS NEWS (Dec. 13, 2020, 12:03 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/covid19-vaccine-alex-azar-face-the-nation/.
87
Joe Mahr & Robert McCoppin, In Illinois Nursing Homes, Tens of Thousands Still
Waiting for COVID-19 Vaccinations: “This is Beyond an Emergency,” CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 22,
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until after Christmas,88 weeks after the vaccines were authorized.
The weeks-long delays in starting the vaccination process for residents in
long-term care facilities were attributable, in large part, due to failures of
interagency coordination. In practice, the problem was one of informed
consent. A large number of residents of long-term care facilities may have
delegated their medical decision-making authority to a family member or
other party, such as if the resident suffers from dementia or another illness. 89
As a result, the medical staff at the facility could not simply ask each resident
whether they would like to receive an FDA-authorized (but still not formally
approved) vaccine. They needed to communicate with every resident’s
authorized medical decisionmaker. Every facility needed to engage in dozens
or even hundreds of these communication efforts, 90 as well as speaking with
residents who do make their own healthcare decisions. Both types of
communication efforts required lengthy educational efforts, given the novelty
of the products involved. With long-term care facilities already resourceconstrained, this process was expected to take weeks or months.
This process of requiring informed consent was not only foreseeable—it
was foreseen. HHS officials reportedly warned OWS that this process of
education and consent would take time, and that it should begin even before
the FDA’s authorization of either vaccine candidate. 91 In particular, they
warned that there should be “high-level coordination” within the government
2021), https://www.chicagotribune.com/coronavirus/ct-illinois-nursing-home-vaccinationdelay-20210123-dz7lvyqt5vhuzh2jrzudevhlwu-story.html; Rebecca Robbins, Frustrations
Boil at Pace of Vaccinations at Long-Term Care Facilities, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/16/business/covid-vaccine-nursing-homes.html
?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage.
88
Miriam Marini, Coronavirus Vaccine Distribution Begins in Michigan, Starting with
Skilled Nursing Homes, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Dec. 28, 2020), https://www.freep.com/story/
news/local/michigan/2020/12/28/coronavirus-vaccine-distribution-nursinghomes/4068134001/; Dhruv Khullar, Why Are So Many Health-Care Workers Resisting the
COVID Vaccine?, NEW YORKER (Feb. 2, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/science/
medical-dispatch/why-are-so-many-health-care-workers-resisting-the-covid-vaccine.
(“Alex Azar . . . suggested that all nursing-home residents could have their first dose by
Christmas. But, even before Azar spoke, many states had informed the C.D.C. that their
programs responsible for nursing-home vaccinations wouldn’t be active until at least
December 28th.”).
89
Fenit Nirappil & Yasmeen Abutaleb, Nursing Homes Face Daunting Task of Getting
Consent Before They Give Coronavirus Vaccines, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/nursing-homes-covid-vaccine-consent-delays/
2020/12/19/730ecd4a-3fd5-11eb-8bc0-ae155bee4aff_story.html.
90
Lauren Harris Kojetin et al., Long-Term Care Providers and Services Users in the
United States 2015-2016, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, at 7 (2019),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_03/sr03_43-508.pdf (“Nursing homes ranged in
capacity from 2 to 1,389 certified beds, with an average of 106 certified beds.”).
91
Nirappil & Abutaleb, supra note 89.
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even before the FDA considered whether to authorize Pfizer’s vaccine
candidate, with former FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb suggesting that
one goal of such collaboration would be to produce a fact sheet for residents
and their medical decisionmakers that could be used in the consent process. 92
Yet the process seemingly did not begin until after the vaccines received FDA
authorization.93
If OWS wanted to begin vaccinating residents of long-term facilities
sooner, it could have directed the relevant agencies to begin producing such
a consent document or informational sheet even before the vaccines were
authorized. Such a document would have required the participation of the
FDA,94 but the FDA could not have either instigated or completed the process
on its own. As former FDA Commissioners have noted, 95 it would have
required collaboration with agencies with a role in the regulation of those
facilities, especially CMS, as facilities are required to comply with federal
regulations (including those around resident consent)96 to receive
reimbursement under Medicare and Medicaid.97

III. INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION: LEARNING FROM COVID-19
SUCCESSES AND FAILURES
Scholars and policymakers should seek to learn lessons from both the
successes and failures of innovation policy during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Although there are undoubtedly lessons to learn that are relevant to a wide
range of policy questions, at least some of these lessons will bear on questions
of interagency collaboration. The successes and failures of the diagnostic and
vaccine initiatives can help inform best (and worst) practices for interagency
collaboration in the innovation policy space, in at least three ways: exploring
the role of agenda-setting power, appreciating the importance of
organizational structure, and establishing a culture of collaboration.
Importantly, we ought to be wary of overlearning lessons drawn from crises
in general, but also from a singular event, especially if singular personalities
92

Id.
Some officials argued that it would have been premature or even more problematic to
formulate a fact sheet prior to authorization, particularly if the FDA’s review “produced
additional data and risks that were not yet known.” Id. But nursing home staff noted that they
had been receiving conflicting directions from the federal government throughout this
process, as well. Id.
94
Id.
95
Scott Gottlieb (@ScottGottliebMD), TWITTER, (Dec. 13, 2020, 6:51 PM),
https://twitter.com/ScottGottliebMD/status/1338270360769323009.
96
42 C.F.R. § 483.10 (2021).
97
42 C.F.R. § 483.1(b) (2021).
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are involved. As such, this Part presents other examples of interagency
collaboration drawn from more typical circumstances to support or refute
these arguments. At the same time, the scale and urgency of the COVID-19
pandemic may offer opportunities to learn about whole-of-government
efforts that are not present in smaller-scale examples of interagency
collaboration.
A. The Role of Agenda-Setting Power
This lesson is simple to state: the President and agency heads have great
agenda-setting power and can direct some amount of agency capacity toward
their policy priorities. Relatedly, the President and agency heads can also act
(or fail to act) to signal that something is not a priority, such that regulators
will not or cannot address the issue. Presidential or agency head activities and
statements not only signal the importance of a particular issue, but are likely
essential for follow-through as well. Especially where a certain instance of
collaboration is likely difficult or unwanted (by lower-level agency officials),
executive-level focus matters to both focus and refocus attention on the
policy goal at hand. This matters particularly in encouraging interagency
collaboration, where inertia (particularly in the form of organizational
barriers to starting such collaborations) may be of greater concern.
In the COVID-19 context, the application of this lesson was simple:
President Trump did not want the United States to develop robust diagnostic
testing capacity. Testing was “overrated,”98 he said. “If we didn’t do any
testing, we would have very few cases.” 99 He “said to [his] people, ‘slow the
testing down please.’”100 After all, “[w]hen you test, you create cases”—and
testing “makes us look bad.” 101
To be clear, this belief was far from universally held, and many career
scientists and agency staff understood deeply—and quite early—the potential
threat the virus posed.102 But at least some political appointees may have
98
Aaron Blake, Trump’s Continually Strange Comments on Possibly “Overrated”
Coronavirus Testing, WASH. POST (May 15, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/2020/05/15/trumps-thoroughly-strange-commentary-coronavirus-testing/.
99
Id.
100
Maegan Vazquez, Trump Now Says He Wasn’t Kidding When He Told Officials to
Slow Down Coronavirus Testing, Contradicting Staff, CNN (June 23, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/22/politics/donald-trump-testing-slow-downresponse/index.html. Although aides asserted that the comment was made as a joke, the
President responded, “I don’t kid . . . let me make it clear.” Id.
101
Sharon Begley, Trump Said More COVID-19 Testing “Creates More Cases.” We
Did the Math, STAT (July 20, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/07/20/trump-saidmore-covid19-testing-creates-more-cases-we-did-the-math/.
102
Perhaps most notably, the CDC’s Dr. Nancy Messonier, the Director of the agency’s
National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, publicly warned in February
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feared taking aggressive actions that would have angered the president. For
instance, the Wall Street Journal concluded that HHS Secretary Azar “waited
for weeks to brief the president on the threat, oversold his agency’s progress
in the early days and didn’t coordinate effectively across the health-care
divisions under his purview.”103 Particularly early on, delays like these may
have slowed the development of robust testing capacity and allowed the virus
to spread unnoticed within the United States. Later, some political appointees
even came to advocate for a “herd immunity” strategy, writing explicitly
about lower-risk groups that “we want them infected.” 104 News reports have
documented efforts by political appointees within both the White House and
HHS to interfere in the CDC’s work throughout the pandemic, 105 which may
have made it more difficult for the agency to coordinate with other sciencefocused agencies.
By contrast, President Trump wanted very badly for the United States to
develop a vaccine as quickly as possible, and he attempted to suggest as
clearly as he could—albeit without ever explicitly promising—that a vaccine
would be ready by Election Day. Privately, it was reported that he appeared
“fixated” on the need to “deliver a vaccine—or at least convince the public
that one is very near” by Election Day, consistently “press[ing] health
officials to speed up the vaccine timeline . . . .”106 His public comments
reflected this goal. In early September 2020, he stated that “[w]e’re going to
have a vaccine very soon, maybe even before a very special date.” 107 In mid2020 that the public should prepare for community spread of the virus and significant
disruptions to daily life, including school closures. Erica Werner et al., Coronavirus’ Spread
in U.S. is “Inevitable,” CDC Warns, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2020/02/25/cdc-coronavirus-inevitable/.
In
response, President Trump threatened to fire Dr. Messonier, Ballhaus & Armour, supra note
34, and sidelined the CDC more generally from briefing the American public. Lena H. Sun,
CDC, the Top U.S. Public Health Agency, Is Sidelined During Coronavirus Pandemic,
WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/03/19/cdc-topus-public-health-agency-is-sidelined-during-coronavirus-pandemic/.
103
Ballhaus & Armour, supra note 34.
104
Dan Diamond, “We Want Them Infected”: Trump Appointee Demanded “Herd
Immunity” Strategy, Emails Reveal, POLITICO (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.politico.com/
news/2020/12/16/trump-appointee-demanded-herd-immunity-strategy-446408.
105
Dan Diamond, Trump Officials Interfered with CDC Reports on COVID-19,
POLITICO (Sept. 11, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/11/exclusive-trumpofficials-interfered-with-cdc-reports-on-covid-19-412809; Noah Weiland, “Like a Hand
Grasping”: Trump Appointees Describe the Crushing of the CDC, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/16/us/politics/cdc-trump.html.
106
Philip Rucker et al., Trump Fixates on the Promise of a Vaccine—Real or Not—as
Key to Reelection Bid, WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/trump-vaccine-election/2020/09/05/c0da86d6-edf5-11ea-99a171343d03bc29_story.html.
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September, he said that “[w]e think we can start [vaccine distribution]
sometime in October.”108 In late October, he said “[w]e have a vaccine that’s
coming, it’s ready.”109
But President Trump didn’t just talk about the need to develop a vaccine
in record time—he also took action to bring it about. He brought in Dr.
Moncef Slaoui, formerly the Chairman of Global Vaccines at
GlaxoSmithKline, as a chief advisor to lead OWS alongside General Gustave
Perna.110 More problematically, his chief of staff initially blocked the FDA’s
release of its revised vaccine EUA guidance, believing that the guidance’s
call for two months of safety follow-up data would preclude the possibility
of a vaccine authorization before Election Day. 111 The President publicly
suggested that these guidelines “sound[] like a political move.” 112 It was clear
to all staffers, political and non-political, that vaccine development was a top
priority, and it is difficult to overstate the apparent public contradiction
between these two positions on diagnostics and vaccines.
The general form of this insight is not novel, as the literature has already
noted the importance of Presidential focus in encouraging interagency
collaboration efforts.113 In the health innovation context alone, the Human
Genome Project is one example of this lesson, where President Clinton’s
support (financial, administrative, and otherwise) of the program over his
Predicting It’s Possible Before Election Day, ABC NEWS (Sept. 8, 2020),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-makes-rosy-vaccine-timing-front-centercampaign/story?id=72877119.
108
THE WHITE HOUSE, Remarks by President Trump in Press Briefing (Sept. 16, 2020,
5:17 PM), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-presidenttrump-press-briefing-september-16-2020/.
109
THE COMM’N ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, Presidential Debate at Belmont University
in Nashville, Tennessee (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.debates.org/voter-education/debatetranscripts/october-22-2020-debate-transcript.
110
DEPT. OF DEF., Trump Administration Announces Framework and Leadership for
“Operation Warp Speed” (May 15, 2020), https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/
Release/Article/2310750/trump-administration-announces-framework-and-leadership-foroperation-warp-speed/.
111
Sharon LaFraniere & Noah Weiland, White House Blocks New Coronavirus Vaccine
Guidelines, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/05/us/politics/
coronavirus-vaccine-guidelines.html. The guidance was eventually released publicly, after
the FDA was able to append the substance of the guidance to the briefing documents for an
October FDA Advisory Committee meeting. Michael Mezher, FDA Issues COVID-19
Vaccine EUA Guidance After Clash With White House, REGUL. AFFS. PRO. SOC’Y (Oct. 6,
2020), https://www.raps.org/news-and-articles/news-articles/2020/10/fda-issues-covid-19vaccine-eua-guidance-after-cla.
112
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Trump May Reject Tougher FDA Vaccine Standards, Calling
Them “Political,” N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
09/23/us/politics/coronavirus-science.html.
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Freeman & Rossi, supra note 12, at 1197. To be sure, there has been less focus on
executive interference with interagency collaboration.
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eight years in office was surely important to its ultimate success.114 But the
opposing positions taken by President Trump on diagnostics and vaccines
allow for a sharpening of the broader point. In the diagnostics context, at least
some career officials within different federal agencies very much wanted to
develop accurate testing technology. If the President had either supported this
goal or had even remained absent from the discussion entirely, diagnostic
development and relevant coordination toward that goal might have
proceeded apace. But in a situation where the President and particular
political appointees publicly (and perhaps privately) opposed this goal, career
civil servants were unable to overcome this intransigence for weeks.
B. The Importance of Organizational Structure
Another potential distinction to draw between the diagnostic and vaccine
case studies is to consider the importance of organizational structure. . How
much of the failure of the early diagnostic roll-out was due to the localization
of the dispute within HHS, and how much of the initial success of OWS was
due to its higher-level organization, led by the White House? To be sure, it is
difficult to answer this question, and especially difficult to disentangle the
organizational structure of the innovation actors from the agenda-setting
powers of the individuals at the helm (as noted above). But when considering
the ideal organizational structure for a particular innovation project, it is
important to consider 1) the legal, regulatory, and practical tools needed to
accomplish that goal and 2) the institutional structure needed to bring each of
those tools to the table.
For instance, it is likely that important elements of OWS’ innovation
success came from its combination of scientific authority and logistical
expertise, which arose only from the higher-level work to unite the leadership
of HHS and DOD. OWS’ incorporation of scientific and regulatory expertise
from HHS and its component agencies was likely essential in the selection of
a diverse range of vaccine candidates and in shepherding them through the
complex regulatory system in record time. Simultaneously, the logistical
expertise of the military leadership was undoubtedly key to overcoming
barriers to manufacturing scale-up, as Moderna’s examples115 illustrate. As a
result, OWS could not have been housed within HHS or DOD alone, but
needed to be constituted at a higher level to combine resources of a broad
range of agencies. In many ways, OWS was also a public-private partnership,
114
See, e.g., NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., NHGRI History and Timeline of Events
(2020),
https://www.genome.gov/about-nhgri/Brief-History-Timeline
(highlighting
NHGRI’s elevation within the NIH, support of legislation arising out of the project, formal
White House announcements of milestones, and President Clinton’s “Executive Order to
prevent genetic discrimination in any federal workplace” in February 2000).
115
See supra text accompanying note 71.
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involving relationships with large, complex companies with high levels of
regulatory sophistication.116
With the diagnostic roll-out, by contrast, it should have been possible to
construct and scale-up a primarily HHS-led testing effort. RADx is just one
example of this, bringing together NIH, CDC, and FDA to drive innovation
in new diagnostic technologies for COVID-19. 117 At least in the beginning,
those agencies possessed the scientific and regulatory expertise to develop
these tests and provide regulatory clarity for private-sector firms seeking to
develop them as well.118 It is not necessarily clear that siting the diagnostic
effort within the White House, rather than within HHS, would have been
necessary for the success of the effort (and could even have been
counterproductive, given the President’s stated concerns about testing
capacity). It may be that in this case, organizational structure may have been
less important than the identity and motivations of the particular individuals
in charge.
The issue of organizational structure has applications for at least two
broader discussions occurring in the literature, beyond the COVID-19
context. One is the idea raised in prior scholarship regarding the creation and
role of an innovation regulator with some authority to coordinate innovation
goals across agencies. Professors Arti Rai and Stuart Benjamin have
proposed the creation of an independent Office of Innovation Policy housed
within the White House, rather than within individual component agencies
(like HHS or the Environmental Protection Agency), to serve this function.119
Giving this office the authority to propose new areas for agency action and
also to respond to agency proposals (such as through the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs review process) 120 would allow for
broader input into the innovation process than currently exists. Particularly
for innovation projects seeming to require a whole-of-government response,
as with OWS, siting this regulator within the White House structure would
appear to be most effective. But as they note, there are advantages of
developing specialized knowledge in particular fields (including

116

A fuller explanation of the role of public-private partnerships in interagency
collaboration is beyond the scope of this piece.
117
See NAT’L INST. HEALTH, supra note 39. RADx also includes BARDA and DARPA
as partners, but their inclusion is not an obstacle to housing the effort within the NIH.
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Shawn Boburg et al., Inside the Coronavirus Testing Failure: Alarm and Dismay
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https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2020/04/03/coronavirus-cdc-test-kitspublic-health-labs/.
119
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Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 6, 61–62 (2008).
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healthcare),121 and in practice this might translate into the appointment of
staff members with expertise in different fields. 122
Rai and Benjamin, though, note the potential costs of such centralization,
including the problem of “bad decision-making (whether due to capture or
otherwise).”123 Clearly, such problems are not unique to decisions that are
centralized within the White House (as compared to those devolved to the
relevant expert agencies). But it is also possible that elevating some of these
issues can create political or logistical problems where they might have
otherwise been avoided. The goal, instead, might be to preserve the
possibility of White House-led innovation but without requiring it, allowing
HHS itself to manage internal innovation disputes as they arise in the first
instance.124
More generally, discussions around interagency coordination—
particularly those that relate to HHS and its component agencies, including
NIH, CDC, FDA, and CMS—implicate the ongoing policy and scholarly
discussions around whether the FDA should become an independent agency.
Even prior to the pandemic, multiple former FDA Commissioners (serving
under presidents from different parties) argued that the FDA should be moved
out of HHS and reconfigured as an independent agency. 125 The former
Commissioners note the “administrative bottlenecks” that can occur given
the need to obtain “multiple levels of clearance” within HHS, but also that
independence would better allow the agency to “protect its integrity.” 126
That integrity has been severely tested over the last few years, but
especially during the pandemic.127 HHS has taken a number of administrative
actions both within and outside the COVID-19 context to usurp the FDA’s
authority in a variety of areas. To name just a few: In the summer of 2020,
over objections from FDA Commissioner Stephen Hahn, HHS Secretary
Azar stripped the FDA of its ability to regulate a large segment of diagnostic
121
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Administration’s Final Days, POLITICO (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.politico.com/news/
2021/01/12/fda-independence-hhs-458515 (describing rising tensions between the HHS and
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tests, including (but not limited to) those used for COVID-19. 128 In
September, HHS issued a statement requiring the HHS Secretary—rather
than the FDA Commissioner—to formally sign various FDA regulatory
actions. The impact of this statement was to jeopardize ongoing litigation
involving the agency, as well as to limit its independence. 129 And in January
2021, HHS signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the United
States Department of Agriculture that would strip the FDA’s jurisdiction over
certain genetically modified animals and give that authority to the
Department of Agriculture—a move long sought by the livestock industry. 130
FDA Commissioner Hahn took the very unusual step of disagreeing with
HHS’ decision publicly, stating in a lengthy thread on Twitter that “FDA does
not support the Memorandum of Understanding” signed by HHS. 131 He was
supported by former Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, who called the agreement
an “unprecedented usurping of FDA public health authority.”132 These and
other actions support the Commissioners’ calls for increased agency
independence.133
At the same time, some of the Commissioners’ goals for the agency—
including “speed[ing] the development of biomedical innovations” 134—will
often require collaboration with other agencies which are currently under the
128

Adam Cancryn & Sarah Owermohle, HHS Chief Overrode FDA Officials to Ease
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auspices of HHS, including NIH, CDC, and CMS. As a result, formally
moving the FDA out of HHS could possibly make innovation collaborations
that are organized by HHS more difficult, and would give credence to the
argument by Professors Rai and Benjamin that such coordination should be
done by a White House-led entity. More specifically, it would make it more
challenging for a motivated HHS Secretary to encourage interagency
collaborations that involved FDA. At the same time, though, FDA has already
taken many of the needed procedural steps to establish formal informationsharing relationships with other agencies,135 which could simplify
collaborations even if it were to become independent.
Existing scholarship has considered efforts to reform agencies of various
types in the wake of systemic crises or failures, including the September 11
attacks, financial crisis, or Deepwater Horizon oil spill.136 In some cases,
agency responsibilities have been consolidated post-crisis, 137 and in other
cases they have been split apart.138 In some of these cases, Congressional
reorganization may represent a symbolic response to a true collaboration
failure. But in this case, because the arguments for removing FDA from HHS’
oversight both predate and are meaningfully independent (substantively)
from the pandemic itself, the case for doing so may be strengthened.
C. Establishing a Culture of Collaboration
More fundamentally, these initiatives may help highlight the importance
of establishing a culture of collaboration among the relevant agencies,
particularly where there is no top-down pressure to coordinate. 139 A study of
collaborations occurring between NIH and other HHS agencies (including the
CDC and FDA) found that “[t]he most common method for initiating
successful interagency collaborations was through personal connections and
professional networks,” with “directives from department/agency leadership”
coming in a distant second place.140 Yet agency staff also reported that not
knowing who to contact or how to initiate such collaborations was a
significant barrier to getting a collaboration started.141 These findings suggest
135
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that once collaborative channels exist, those same career staff members may
be more likely to engage in or otherwise support new collaborative efforts in
the future. In short, collaboration breeds collaboration.
In some ways, the combination of these factors may explain why the early
development and dissemination of diagnostic tests for COVID-19 was so
challenging. Not only was there no top-down directive or infrastructure that
created space for collaboration, but the relevant agency decisionmakers may
not have had the required familiarity with each other. The FDA typically uses
its enforcement discretion and declines to regulate large swathes of diagnostic
tests,142 meaning that it is possible they may not have the infrastructure in
place to work with other agencies in this substantive area.
At the same time, though, the FDA does have established formal MOUs
with other HHS agencies, including CDC143 and CMS,144 to allow agency
officials to collaborate when needed. The MOU between FDA and CDC
exists for the purpose of “provid[ing] a framework for coordination and
collaborative efforts between these two agencies,”145 noting that the two
“sister agencies” both “exist and work to protect the public health but have
different statutory mandates and responsibilities.”146 Under the terms of the
MOU, each agency must “designate central contact points” for
communication with the other agency. 147 The MOU was renewed in June of
2019,148 and in theory should have enabled the needed communication
between the two agencies. Perhaps this suggests that, in at least some cases,
so huge, and so it’s figuring out where to start [that is the biggest barrier].”).
142
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directives from agency leadership may be necessary, though certainly not
sufficient, to drive innovative activity forward.
Similarly, the makeup of OWS may help explain the problems
encountered in vaccine administration. Reporting suggests that OWS’
military leadership prioritized metrics around vaccine distribution rather than
vaccine administration, preferring instead to delegate responsibility for
administration to state and local officials.149 By contrast, many health policy
officials encouraged OWS to develop a “last mile” strategy for vaccine
administration.150 The CDC’s Dr. Nancy Messonier noted the collaborative
difficulties involved in “rapidly mashing together two cultures,” 151 and those
difficulties (when combined with the other personnel and ideological
approaches involved) may have diminished OWS’ focus on the
administration problem.
Going forward, policymakers should consider a range of ideas that would
foster a culture of collaboration.152 These ideas may take the form of
encouragement, mandates, or encouraging mandates. As an example of an
encouraging mandate, Congress has instructed the NIH to report annually on
the “activities of the National Institutes of Health involving collaboration
with other agencies of the Department of Health and Human Services.” 153
Congress has required this reporting as a way of encouraging the NIH to
“increase interagency collaboration and coordination,”154 but most of these
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(several hundred)155 collaborations themselves are not mandated.156
Congress might also consider amendments to the Public Health Service
Act’s emergency declaration powers that would encourage similar
collaborative efforts. The Secretary of HHS has the authority to declare a
Public Health Emergency under Section 319 of the Public Health Service
Act,157 a declaration which unlocks a broad range of emergency powers under
federal law.158 Many of these powers authorize the Secretary to access and
use particular emergency funds, to grant waivers or modifications of various
public health insurance programs (including Medicare and Medicaid 159), or
otherwise to work collaboratively with state and local governments to
respond to the relevant emergency.160 But very few of the Act’s provisions
seem to contemplate interagency coordination at the federal level, outside of
quite narrow circumstances.161
Policymakers might consider strengthening permissive or encouraging
statutes like these to become encouraging mandates. Rather than merely
155
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allowing collaboration, policymakers could go a step further by requiring
some form of information-sharing (even just meetings) between related
agencies as a consequence of a declared public health emergency.
Importantly, policymakers could stop short of requiring active collaboration
itself (as with the NIH reporting requirements above). But creating a statutory
or regulatory channel to force the provision of relevant information about
topics of mutual interest may be important to ensure that the relevant agencies
are fully informed.

IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has examined two examples of health innovation
policymaking during the COVID-19 pandemic—the development of
diagnostic tests and of vaccines—and explored the ways in which they
represent both successes and failures of interagency collaboration. Although
we should endeavor not to put too much weight on the particulars of any one
case study, the particular emergency challenges created by the pandemic
provide valuable opportunities to improve innovation policymaking going
forward. Lessons learned from these innovation case studies may be useful
to scholars and policymakers considering problems of interagency
collaboration more generally.

